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SO:  This is Dr Sue Onslow interviewing Mr Dave Steward in Cape Town on a 
very wet Wednesday, 17th April 2013. Dave, thank you very much indeed 
for agreeing to talk to me. I wonder if you could begin by saying, 
please… Having been born in Kenya then educated in Canada, did you 
form a particular view of the Commonwealth as a boy and young man? 
 
DS:  Before I do that, I’d just like to start with a story about Sonny Ramphal. When 
I was at the United Nations, after the very reluctant departure of Kurt 
Waldheim, everybody was casting about for a new Secretary General. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick – who was, at that time, the Ambassador of the United States to 
the UNO – had heard of this guy Sonny Ramphal, and thought he might be a 
good candidate. So, she asked her staff to set up an appointment with Sonny 
Ramphal. But, unfortunately, they got it wrong and instead of inviting Sonny 
Ramphal to this interview they invited a guy called ‘Ramphul’, [Laughter] who 
was the very flamboyant representative of Mauritius, at the time. He was 
renowned for his bright red socks! [Laughter] Ramphul said, “What's it in 
connection with?” “Well, we’re interested in speaking to people about being 
candidates for the position of Secretary General of the United Nations.” You 
can imagine his delight! [Laughter] 
 
SO:  [Laughter] When was it realised that this wasn’t quite the gentleman 
they had in mind? 
 
DS:  Well, I think that after the introductions had been made, the penny dropped. 
[Laughter] Needless to say, he was very disappointed. 
 
SO:  Indeed, he would have been! I know that Sonny Ramphal was also 
disappointed not to have been appointed Secretary General of the UN.  
 
DS:  Okay, right. I started school in Canada, and Canada at that time was still very, 
very much a part of the British Commonwealth and the whole ethos that went 
with it. My Grade Three teacher, Mrs Dougherty, was of the opinion that 
nobody could ever surpass Queen Victoria in the role that they [the British] 
played in international and global affairs. There was, in fact, a national holiday 
on Queen Victoria’s birthday, which was 24th May. 
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SO:  Empire Day. 
 
DS:  That’s right. At the time of the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth, there was a 
great outburst of royalist fervour in Canada. I had the great honour of being 
called on to draw and establish the little golden coach and the royal montage 
around our classroom. So, my sentiments were strongly royalist. Then I 
actually went from there to school in England and I spent the rest of my prep 
school days in London. I then went to an English public school – St John’s 
School, Leatherhead – where I spent three relatively agreeable years. The 
nature of such schools was naturally conservative: they all thought The 
Queen was a good idea and also [that] the Commonwealth was a good idea. 
So, I had very strong affinities with Britain and my education at school was, in 
essence, British, and I had a great affection for the culture and the history. I 
came back to South Africa in 1960 when I was 16, and I went to Stellenbosch 
University, which was a bit of a change.  
 
I started at Stellenbosch in 1962 and it was a completely different experience, 
as you can imagine – in many respects, a very pleasant experience. My 
father’s objective was to give me some emotion on the other side, the 
Afrikaans side. He was a diplomat, who had been posted in East Africa, 
Canada and then London. So, I arrived at Stellenbosch in the early 60s, when 
it was quite a different place from what it is now, and I really enjoyed it. It was 
an extraordinarily pleasant, lovely place: lots of academic stimulation and 
interesting politics. I did a not-very-demanding course centering on Political 
Philosophy – which is a wonderfully nebulous subject – [as well as] English 
and French. The whole objective of our Political Philosophy professor – 
whose name was Johannes Degenaar – was to urge young Afrikaaners to re-
examine their values and their orientation in politics. My general response to 
that was reactionary. But I actually had lunch with him and a friend, one of my 
classmates, a couple of weeks ago. It was quite an interesting occasion: to 
see how, after the great gulf of years, things had changed, in that period.  
 
I emerged from Stellenbosch University with a BA degree, some 
understanding of political philosophy, a moderate command of English [and] a 
smattering of French. [Laughter] I was still very young, so I decided that, 
rather than going into a career, I would be a journalist for a year. I joined the 
staff of the South African equivalent of Time Magazine – it was called News 
Check. The editor was a very feisty, liberal, verlichte Afrikaner by the name 
[of] Otto Krause. I had an interesting exposure to ordinary life in South Africa, 
because we covered stories in the Townships; we went to the rural areas and 
covered elections and all of the other tribal ceremonies of the National Party 
at the time. So, it was very interesting, but it was a bit of a strain because you 
have to meet deadlines if you are a journalist. I quite enjoyed the back room 
stuff and working out by-lines on articles that I’d written on Africa – ‘War 
trouble in Mauritania’ – or commenting on the great number of coloured 
teachers who were leaving South Africa to go to Australia and Canada, which 
I dubbed the ‘Breyne drain’, breyne being the Afrikaans word for brown. And I 
enjoyed that but I was still very shy; I actually probably invented the concept 
of ‘nerd’ when I was at Stellenbosch University. I was quite tall [and] very thin; 
I wore extraordinarily thick spectacles and, I have to confess, I wore sandals 
with yellow socks. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  I'm just thinking, was there any tweed in this particular ensemble? 
[Laughter] 
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DS:  There was a tweed jacket! [Laughter] 
 
SO:  That’s quite an image you're conjuring up! 
 
DS:  Now you have the picture! In any event, after a year with News Check – or 
nine months – I decided to apply to the Department of Foreign Affairs. I saw 
an advertisement in the Johannesburg Star and I cut it out and I sent it in. But 
with my father’s contacts, I think I probably had a bit of a head start. I was 
also quite interested in international affairs, so I could answer most of the 
questions. I scored points because I read News & World Report rather than 
Time Magazine. So, I became a cadet at the Department of Foreign Affairs 
which was, again, very, very pleasant. The Department of Foreign Affairs was 
a wonderful place because the outcome of your career had actually very little 
to do with the energy or intelligence that you invested in the project. 
[Laughter] It was completely by happenstance. [Laughter] So, I went off to 
Australia – my first post was to Canberra… 
 
SO:  When you joined in 1966, the DFA was certainly a government 
department that attracted the English-speaking community in South 
Africa… 
 
DS:  Yes. 
 
SO:  …more than the Afrikaans-speaking? 
 
DS:  I think it was about 50/50. 
 
SO:  Was there a cultural tension between the two? 
 
DS:  Not at all. The interesting thing about my career in the public service was that 
I was extremely English-speaking – because of my background, I didn’t really 
speak much Afrikaans at that time – and it was never a problem at any time in 
my career. Nobody ever asked me what my political views were, or what party 
I voted for. It just didn’t even come onto the radar. 
 
 So, those are two facets which I think are quite interesting, and I spent three 
and a half very pleasant years in Australia – another Commonwealth country 
– in Canberra, which was just like a big South African county town. But, as a 
young diplomat, it was lots of fun: Sydney was just around the corner, skiing 
in the snowy mountains, catching trout... 
 
SO:  So, you didn’t pick up on any official criticism of South African…? 
 
DS:  Oh yes, a great deal. In fact, when I was there, we had a Springbok rugby 
tour of Australia and New Zealand. It really galvanised public opposition to 
apartheid. There were widespread demonstrations – huge marches along the 
State Circle up to our offices in Canberra. It reminded me a bit of some of the 
scenes of Doctor Zhivago, which was on at the time – or maybe a little bit 
afterwards. And I even had my house painted [with] slogans – ‘Racist, go 
home’ – and all of this, which got me on the Channel 9 News, so I was quite 
chuffed with that. [Laughter] 
 
 All of this just made me much more interested in the debate and the topics, 
and I met some really interesting people there. One of the Australian Labour 
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Party shadow cabinet members invited me back to his home in Melbourne, 
and it changed my idea of socialists – which had not been terribly positive. He 
was a really, thoroughly, decent man. But then again, his colleague – the 
shadow foreign minister at about this time – went to Communist China and 
returned, and made the remarkable statement, “Yeah, we got on very well 
with the Chinese. After all, they are a working-class government with 
principles pretty close to those of the Australian Labour Party.” [Laughter] 
This was China in the time of the Cultural Revolution! [Laughter]  
 
SO:  Hmm. He clearly had not digested what was going on there. 
 
DS:  But it was a fairly intimate place. So, our Ambassador invited Gough Whitlam 
to dinner or lunch on one occasion, with his colleagues - that was interesting. 
And, also, the Prime Minister, John Gorton, who was having an affair with his 
chief aid whose name was Ainsley Gotto. And by an unhappy geographic 
quirk, one of the main features of Canberra is a place called Mount Ainsley, 
so, the joke was, “Where’s the Prime Minister?” “He’s gone to Mount Ainsley!” 
[Laughter] Very Australian. [Laughter] So, the reality is that very few people 
knew very much about the subject of South Africa. Australia was very 
parochial at the time. I used to go and address the Rotary Clubs – the Rotary 
Club of Batemans Bay – and after I’d given them my best pitch, one of the 
guys stood up and said, “Yeah, Mr Steward, that sounds all very well and fine, 
but what the hell are you doing with all them bloody Biafrans!”  
 
SO:  As you say, quite parochial and ill-informed. 
 
DS:  Indeed. But anyway, it was a great experience. I came back to South Africa 
and I spent quite a lot of time here on the North American desk and doing 
parliamentary duty – so, going up and down from Cape Town to Pretoria and 
doing the parliamentary sessions and really enjoying it, but then also learning 
how the system worked and what the constraints were. Particularly, at that 
time, the developing struggle was between Department of Foreign Affairs and 
the Department of Information, which was under the leadership of Eschel 
Rhoodie. [He was] an interesting guy, who was quite clever. We played 
cricket against Information. He [Rhoodie] was a great sportsman, and he 
would bat a metre outside of his crease. He’d hit the bowling around, but one 
of the realities of cricket – and indeed of politics – is that if you bat a metre 
outside of your crease, you are going to be stumped.  
 
SO:  You are. You’ve stepped too far out of your safety zone. 
 
DS:  You’ve stepped too far out of your safety zone. Now, he made no secret of his 
political ambitions and of the very high opinion he had of his own performance 
and qualities. He let it be known, more or less, that Connie Mulder was going 
to become the next Prime Minister, and that when Connie Mulder became 
Prime Minister, he was going to become Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was 
really very brash and upfront. And he also, as the Secretary for Information, 
fell into the enormous pit of communicating on behalf of other government 
departments, because that is the great temptation.  
 
SO:  To try to be the mouthpiece? 
 
DS:  Yes. Now, if your political head, like Connie Mulder, is the crown prince, you 
can pull it off, because you have necessary power. But you alienate people 
immensely. One of the things that I subsequently learned was that, if you 
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communicate badly on behalf of others, they will forgive you, but if you 
communicate well on their behalf, they will never forgive you. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  Because you make them totally redundant. 
 
DS:  That’s right! [Laughter] Anyway, I’ll come back to that later. And so he was 
alienating people, and going up and down in the lifts of the Hendrik Verwoerd 
Building…I saw it was not only the Department of Foreign Affairs that was 
unhappy with Eschel Rhoodie, but it was a whole lot of other government 
departments. That brings me on to another reality of politics, and that is that 
you don’t get fired for screwing up; you get fired for screwing up when you 
don’t have anybody to cover your back. So, the reality is that, when the 
Information Scandal broke, had Eschel Rhoodie and Connie Mulder not made 
themselves so unpopular with the rest of the establishment, the establishment 
would have closed ranks behind them.  
 
SO: As it was, they all folded their arms and smiled.  
 
DS: They all folded their arms and smiled. They left Prime Minister John Vorster 
dangling in the wind. So, those are rather important things to learn as a young 
officer: to realise that this is what the world is actually about. It's about making 
alliances and not making enemies, and a lot of it is about positional play. 
 
SO:  Was this particularly how the game of politics was played here, in South 
Africa, or do you think that’s a truism? 
 
DS:  I think that’s absolutely universal. It’s universal. And the other thing, too, is 
how very unwise it is to make no secret of your ambitions. 
 
SO:  I’d agree there. Naked ambition is never attractive. 
 
DS:  Not a good idea. So, anyway, then from South Africa I went to Canada, and I 
was called into the office of the head of the North American division and he 
said, “Look, Steward, one thing I must tell you is that we really haven't got an 
interest in what happens in Canada. But, have a good time!” [Laughter] 
 
SO:  So, did you feel you were being cast off to outer darkness and 
everlasting night? [Laughter]  
 
DS:  For me, it was very much like snakes and ladders. Roll the die and you step 
on a ladder or you step on a snake. This was a minor snake. 
 
SO:  At least you hadn’t gone back down to square one. 
 
DS:  Then, as the Fates would have it... had Mr John Becker been a student of 
Greek mythology, he would have realised the danger of tempting the Gods, 
because he was then posted as the South African Ambassador to Canada! 
[Laughter] 
  
SO:  That’s rather a delicious irony. [Laughter] So, when did you go to 
Canada? 
 
DS:  I went there in 1976. 
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SO:  That was an interesting year to go and defend the South African 
interest. 
 
DS:  It was. In fact, it was just after the Soweto riots, so the situation was 
becoming very tense. I went across there, and Ottawa is…I don’t know, have 
you been to Ottawa? 
 
SO:  I was there two weeks ago. 
 
DS:  Yes, well, you would understand. It's a great place to be as a kid, because 
you have a lot of seasonal change, lots of festivals – Easter, Halloween – 
punctuating the year, which make it really nice for a kid. But it is really boring. 
It's a really boring place. So, my parting advice to my Canadian friends – 
which I didn’t give them, because I was a diplomat – would have been to 
erect warning signs on all of the approaching highways: “Turn off your higher 
brain functions. You are now approaching Canadian Capital Territory.” 
[Laughter] It's a bit unkind, because the Canadians are the nicest people you 
could ever hope to meet. So, when I watch Canadian cop and robber movies 
on TV – and there are some quite good ones – I find it very difficult to believe 
they’ve actually got crooks! And I've developed this idea that if you were to 
line up a Canadian, an Australian, an American, a Brit, an Irishman, what 
have you... with no distinguishing marks, you’d be able to pick out the 
Canadian immediately – by the look of vacuous goodwill. [Laughter]  
 
SO:  In terms of your professional responsibilities there, was it a tough 
diplomatic post? 
 
DS:  It was the toughest diplomatic post, because nothing was happening. There 
was no material to work with. I was the second-in-command of the Embassy, 
and so I ran the Embassy, but there was very little possibility of really 
achieving anything at that time in Canada. I took the South Africa desk officer 
out to lunch at one of the places in Hull, across the river, and wanted to get to 
know him. I didn’t want to make any challenging statements. His name was 
Geoff Weir, [and] he was absolutely bristling with indignation. And I just said 
to him, “Well, you know, is there anything that we can do that will satisfy 
you?” He said, “No, not really.” So, that was a bit discouraging. 
 
SO:  Well, you had a tough brief as a diplomat then, because after all, South 
Africa had moved troops into Angola and was being castigated at the 
UN and under huge pressure to withdraw. 
 
DS:  Well, we moved the troops into Angola with the support of half of the 
members of the OAU… 
 
SO:  From the January vote at the OAU Addis meeting, yes, which was 
evenly balanced… 
 
DS:  That’s right, and with the support of and at the request of the Americans. Not 
quite as black and white as one might think. 
 
SO:  Were you aware of that? This question of whether you had American 
encouragement and support? 
 
DS:  Yes, I was aware of that at that time. 
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SO:  Because I know that this was enormously controversial, with Pik Botha, 
your Ambassador to the US, only finding out what was going on from 
watching American television screens and then contacting Prime 
Minister Vorster, who said, “I have it on the very highest authority that 
we have American backing on this.” 
 
DS:   Yeah, maybe I picked that up later, but I think that the orientation of the OAU 
was fairly well known at that time. The commander was talking about “the 
tiger with her ravening cubs” coming into Africa. So, yes, it was a very difficult 
brief but what I'm pointing out is there was nothing really to do: the doors of 
the Department of External Affairs were closed, virtually. There was a little 
work that you could do on the trade side, and you could address groups of 
Empire loyalists and this and that. But it was all extremely peripheral and very 
frustrating, and the image that I had of it was of the elm tree outside my office 
window dying of Dutch elm disease, which seemed to sum up the situation. 
[Laughter]. I then tried to urge our Ambassador to take a more activist role. 
He was a quintessential gentleman, who had been in the army during the 
Second World War – moustache, intelligent man, sensitive man… I said, 
“Look, you’ve got to go and try and put the case on TV. You can't expect 
Canadians to understand what's going on if we don’t put our case.” And he 
did, and he just didn’t have the debating skills to make his point. He was 
carved up – little pieces of Ambassador all over the studio walls. Then he left. 
He was recalled to South Africa at the end of his tour, and I went to the 
farewell lunch for him at the Department of External Affairs and it was a little 
bit strained, as you can imagine. And he said, “I must apologise. I believe that 
I failed to do my duty as an Ambassador here because the relationship 
between Canada and South Africa has deteriorated to such an extent during 
my posting here.” And they said, “Oh, no, it's not you as an individual.” But it 
was an indication of the extreme difficulty of doing anything at all as a 
diplomat under those circumstances. Then, fortunately, I stepped on a ladder 
– or a ladder came and stepped on me, whichever way it was – and after less 
than two years in Ottawa I was transferred to New York. 
 
 New York was a completely different kettle of fish, because there one was 
dealing with real issues: negotiations on Namibia, where South Africa – 
although the villain of the piece – was the role player, so you had the raw 
materials of diplomacy that you could work with. I arrived just before the 
adoption of Resolution 435. I spent a lot of the subsequent three or four or 
five years working on the Namibian negotiations, which were very interesting, 
and which indicated, again, the bad faith of the West and of the five Contact 
Group countries. The reality is that, when Resolution 435 was adopted, 
Resolution 432 was adopted, too, which simply gave Walvis Bay to Namibia. 
This was pulled at a very late stage against South Africa, without really giving 
us proper warning – by the West, by the five Western countries on the UN 
Security Council – because that was the price that SWAPO had demanded 
for their even considering to go along with 435. It was absolutely illegal. There 
was not a respectable international jurist in the world who would have tried to 
argue that Walvis Bay was not properly a part of South Africa. It had been 
even before the advent of the Germans in the territory. I can assure you it is. 
 
SO: I'm just trying to visualise…I know the importance of that deepwater 
port on the South West African coast, and I’m just trying to visualise, 
geographically, exactly where it is and its distance from what was 
identified as South Africa… 
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DS:  Oh, it's a long way. It’s half way up the coastline. But that is neither here nor 
there. It was part of South Africa in terms of international law – even the UN’s 
own international lawyers admitted that – but it was simply given to SWAPO. 
It was then the first of a number of deep disillusionments with the West. The 
reality is that whenever SWAPO objected to anything, the West would come 
around to SWAPO’s way of thinking, and they would re-double their efforts on 
South Africa to make the necessary concessions. 
 
SO:  In what way was SWAPO encouraged to elicit support particularly from 
within the Western contact group? What was the balance of opinion 
within that group? Was the Carter administration particularly 
sympathetic towards a particular African Liberation movement? 
 
DS:  Well, it’s not just SWAPO. They were confronted by the Afro-Asian block at 
the United Nations – and, of course, the Afro-Asian block was being egged on 
by the Russians. So, it was enormous pressure that could be brought to bear 
on the West, and there were numerous indications of this. So, for example 
after we’d agreed to implementation, we went ahead with the invitation to the 
UN to send a military group to South West Africa to do the detailed planning 
for the implementation of the independence process. The leader of the UN 
group was a General Hannes Philipp from Austria, and they reached an 
agreement with the SADF on how troops should be confined to base and 
what the timing should be, etc., etc. But he went back to New York and the 
SWAPO said, “We’re not going to accept it.” So, Philip was kicked out. 
[Laughter] And they came along with an implementation plan which was 
egregious and completely one-sided. South African forces would be confined 
to their barracks in northern South West Africa and monitored by UNTAG, but 
SWAPO forces just across the border in Southern Angola wouldn’t be 
monitored, but would have immediate access to the most populated part of 
the territory, if they wished so to do. So, there were numerous elements 
where what had been a relatively balanced agreement, drawn up with 
General Philipp, was twisted immediately into a very unbalanced document. 
This, I think, brought us to about the spring of 1979, and PW Botha was 
incensed over this. He regarded this as a breach of faith and he wanted to 
pull out entirely. In fact, he wanted to pull out entirely after the debacle with 
General Philipp, and then he announced that he was going ahead with the 
internal elections at the end of 1978. The West sent a Contact Group to see 
him with Cyrus Vance - I think it was Cyrus Vance – and persuaded him not 
to go for a UDI on the basis of the successful outcome of the election, as far 
as the internal parties were concerned. He then agreed that he would leave it 
up to the parties themselves to decide whether they wished to go back to the 
UN plan – which they did. But then with the next Implementation Plan, which 
was published at the end of February, there were further shocks, again, 
showing the degree to which the Secretary General and the West had 
capitulated to the demands of SWAPO and the African block at the UN. I think 
at the beginning of March PW Botha was keen to break on the whole issue, 
because he was an irascible man. 
 
SO:  Indeed. What was the diplomacy of South Africa’s attempts to resolve 
this issue? Did you form particular alliances behind the scenes at the 
United Nations? Or did you find yourselves increasingly isolated? As 
you say, you were under pressure from an Afro-Asian block and from a 
particularly sympathetic administration in Washington which was 
predisposed to supporting racial justice in southern Africa. 
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DS:  We found ourselves very much on the defensive throughout the Carter 
Presidency – the remaining part of the Carter Presidency. So, we were very 
disillusioned with the behaviour of the West within the Contact Group 
countries in 1978 and 1979. This led to a whole process of proximity talks and 
efforts to…Where I think the West did try to make constructive contribution to 
ensure that the demilitarised zone that we secured, etc., with all sorts of stuff 
that could detect movement through the zone. But it didn’t really amount to 
very much. Then there were more proximity talks in Geneva at the beginning 
of 1980, I think, which ended in an inconsequential manner, but then of 
course Reagan came into office. 
 
SO:  Did the outcome of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe settlement at Lancaster 
House and the subsequent elections influence you dramatically on the 
South West Africa question? 
 
DS:  Not really, no. I think this was firmly on another track at the time. So, in any 
event, the Reagan administration came into office the beginning of 1981 – 
yes, because the election was in 1980. That changed the situation. The 
Americans suddenly had an appreciation for our geostrategic concerns on the 
presence of the Cubans and what have you in Southern Angola, and they 
agreed to ‘linkage’ – that 435 wouldn’t be implemented until the Cubans were 
withdrawn from Angola. So, my period at the United Nations ended in 
December 1982. In 1981, to my enormous surprise, I was made Ambassador 
there. I was only 37, and I think the reason is that nobody else really wanted 
the job. 
 
SO:  I can't believe that! [Laughter]  
 
DS:  I was crazy enough to accept the job. 
 
SO:  Surely it had a lot to do with the knowledge that you had gathered since 
you went to New York from Canada. 
 
DS:  Well, what I did when I went to New York was to try and find out how the old 
phenomenon of the anti-South African campaign fitted together, and I did. I’ll 
get you a book here… This was the result of my analysis which I drew with 
my own hands… 
 
SO:  [Reading from book] ‘Organs and sub-organs of the United Nations 
system involved in activities affecting South Africa’. This diagram is in 
United Nations versus South Africa by Jan C Heunis [Johannesburg: 
Lex Patria, 1986]. Did you contribute to this diagram? 
 
DS:  I made it.  
 
SO:  You made this diagram? It's on page 189. 
 
DS:  I did a 300-page analysis of this campaign against South Africa, and it was 
really clear to me that the Russians were absolutely, intimately involved in the 
whole process, at every stage. 
 
SO:  So, be it the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, the 
International Court of Justice, the Trusteeship Council, the Security 
Council or the Secretariat at the UN – it permeated every level? 
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DS:  Virtually every level. Virtually every speech in the General Assembly – the 
general debate – also included South Africa. 
 
SO:  So, you attributed this entirely to the influence and the direction of 
diplomacy from Moscow. 
 
DS:  Not entirely to, but it was certainly enhanced by the global Soviet capability –  
the Rainbow Coalition, peace councils and allied organisations, anti-apartheid 
movements and what have you. It was an enormously complex thing, and 
each one of these bodies had council meetings and special days and weeks 
against this aspect of apartheid or that aspect of apartheid, whatever it may 
have been. 
 
SO:  Dave, can I ask you…Did you identity any particular Commonwealth 
association or organisation within this multiplicity of associations, 
groupings, [and] committees? 
 
DS:  No, this was purely within the United Nations family, but there would have 
been very similar sentiments within the Commonwealth structures, too. 
 
SO:  I'm just wondering whether there was any overlay of Commonwealth 
identity that you appreciated as a South African diplomat. 
 
DS:  No, not really. For me, this was… Well, I suppose, it was paranoia. We 
thought of inviting the American Psychological Association to set up an 
observer post in our mission, because it was one of the few situations where 
paranoia might be a normal reaction to your environment! 
 
SO:  How far do you think this was a South African interpretation through 
Cold War lenses? 
 
DS:  I don’t think so, no. The Cold War was real. It wasn’t a make-believe thing at 
all. We know that because our forces were involved in Southern Angola as 
late as September I987. In big, big battles, against the Russian- and Cuban-
led forces. So, we had no... and I think subsequently, when the archives were 
opened, yes, Virginia, there was an intention to exploit proxy wars in colonial 
territories – Africa and elsewhere – and there was a National Liberation 
model, as well. I think this probably, obviously, added fuel to the fire of P W 
Botha’s views on the ‘total onslaught’ [i.e. the belief that the South African 
state faced threats on every level of society]. 
 
SO:  Yes. So, you were at the UN until 1982 and then you were called back to 
Cape Town, or to Pretoria? 
 
DS:  Yes, I was. I returned to Cape Town and I was put in charge of what they call 
the ‘Planning Division’ but in effect it was responsibility for Namibia, Southern 
Angola, [and] working directly with the Minister, which I liked a lot. The reality 
is that ambassadors don’t actually have much ability to change events; they 
are right at the end of the tentacle of the beast. They might send a stimulus 
up the tentacle and it might or might not impact on the brain, but it's very 
much a peripheral role. Many ambassadors completely overestimate their 
importance: because everybody else thinks they're important, they think 
they're important. And they send off all sorts of stuff to their headquarters 
saying which way the country should actually go. Most of the time 
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headquarters are not interested, but it is important to keep the headquarters 
briefed on what's happening.  
 
So, for me, the important thing is getting to the heart of the matter, getting into 
positions where you can actually make a difference – very much behind the 
scenes – with real decisions. This was an ideal opportunity because I didn’t 
really have to worry about bureaucracy. I hate bureaucrats. I didn’t really work 
through the Director General or anyone like that. I was fairly junior – I was 
only a councillor – but I had a lot of freedom of movement, and operating on 
that front also meant it was very important for me to build up a good 
relationship with the South African Defence Force, which many of my 
colleagues didn’t do. So, there was always a rather dismissive approach on 
the part of the army – the defence force – towards diplomats, whom they 
characterised as being ‘the lavender power’. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  Dave, this is very much the era – as far as historians are concerned – of 
the State Security Council and the ‘Securocrats’. Is that a 
misrepresentation of the dynamics of decision-making, in fact, at the 
heart of South African foreign policy and diplomacy at this time? 
 
 DS:  Not at all. In fact, PW Botha was a very good administrator and he had quite 
successfully built up the SADF into a really effective fighting organisation, I 
would say. Really effective. They really knew what they were doing, and they 
were disciplined and also not unenlightened. They realised at an early stage 
that there couldn’t be a military outcome: that South Africa couldn’t maintain 
the status quo through military force. At an early stage, they realised that. But 
they were not good in communication [or] public relations and some of the 
more subtle arts…[Laughter]  
 
SO:  ‘The dark arts’ – is that what you're reaching for? [Laughter]  
 
DS:  No, they were quite good at the dark arts! They were not so good at the 
subtle arts. I managed to develop quite a good relationship with them. So, I 
spent a lot of time with General Geldenhuys – playing bridge with him on the 
way to talks with the Angolans, on the way to the operational area. I was the 
contact guy from Foreign Affairs with Jonas Savimbi, who was a very 
impressive man, and who commanded incredible loyalty from the South 
African Defence Force. 
 
SO:  That I knew, yes. 
 
DS:  They had a very high opinion of him. He was very charismatic. 
 
SO:  Yes. Very well educated, and a consummate linguist. 
 
DS:  Very well educated; a linguist. This was around 1984-85, and my son was 
born in 1984. I actually thought of asking Savimbi to be his Godfather, but 
then I said, “No, sooner or later he will sell him out.” 
 
SO:  At this particular point, did you think that Angola could be carved up? 
That UNITA could dominate a separate entity of Angola, in Ovamboland 
or...? 
 
DS:  Not really, no. No. 
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SO:  Okay. I just wondered if this was ever part of the scenario. 
 
DS:  No, it wasn’t. The other reason is that Savimbi wasn’t a nice man. 
Charismatic, but he was an African warlord. A good one – much more 
accomplished and impressive than most – but a warlord, at the end of the 
day. And I developed a good relationship with the Defence Force, where I 
think that they had more respect for me than they had for many of my 
colleagues. But even so, there were often strains. When I went up there they 
said, “Why don’t you wear a uniform, Dave?” I said, “No. Soon as I do that, 
I'm part of your structure.” [Laughter] And I was involved in the process 
leading to the withdrawal of our forces from Angola: the negotiations in 
Lusaka, the Mulungushi Minute and so forth. Then we set up a team together 
with the Angolans – a joint monitoring commission. There was always a 
Foreign Affairs guy that we chose to serve in the bush in Southern Angola. 
Derek Auret was our representative on the Joint Monitoring Commission and I 
used to fly out for meetings with the Angolans. It was very interesting because 
they always came to us for meetings, because we had food. We had food and 
drink. And it was significant that the military guys don’t have a problem with 
one another. Even if they're so-called enemies, they belong to the same 
culture, actually. The soldiers don’t have a problem with one another. Their 
guys… Their soldiers had problems with their diplomats, and our soldiers had 
problems with our diplomats. [Laughter] It's a fairly general phenomenon. But 
it meant that I had to also represent the Department of Foreign Affairs in 
difficult situations. I recall one lunch, soon after our decision to withdraw from 
Angola, where I was having lunch with the Administrator General at 
Windhoek. I was sitting on his left and General Georg Meiring – who was the 
officer commanding at that time – was sitting on his right. General Meiring 
was saying, “Ah, but I don’t see why the army should be forced to give up 
these strong positions that had been won fair and square in battle and… Why 
should the army do it?” I just looked at him – he was a Major General and I 
was the equivalent of a Colonel – and I said, “General, you do it because that 
is the instruction of the civilian government.” [Laughter] 
 
SO:  Yes. “To which you are accountable.” 
 
DS:  Yeah, and his moustaches bristled but he didn’t question it. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  The Commonwealth is nowhere in the scenario you are describing here. 
You're talking about hard-headed politics, hard fought battles on the 
ground, and that the Soviet-Cuban threat in Southern Angola was very 
real and ever present, and was a key factor in how any solution of the 
South West Africa problem was to be resolved. 
 
DS:  Yes. But now, getting back to the Commonwealth, [and to] the Eminent 
Persons Group in 1986. I think that you have to judge that against the 
background of what I've been mentioning. The deep distrust that PW Botha 
developed for the international community in general as a result of his 
experiences during the Namibian negotiations... He wasn’t a guy who wanted 
to be pushed about. Then, if one considers the Commonwealth itself, the 
feelings of the government were particularly negative towards the 
Commonwealth. They dated back to the circumstances under which South 
Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth in 1961, where the Canadian Prime 
Minister John Diefenbaker played a particularly important role. I think [that], 
for many South Africans – especially those of English decent or the old United 
Party supporters – this felt like a great betrayal. I think they realised that 
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Botha was doing what he could to stay on as a member, and leaving the 
Commonwealth was a bit of a betrayal and it was seen to be the work of 
newly emergent independent African members of the Commonwealth and, of 
course, India. But then also, particularly, Canada, and then later Australia.  
 
SO:   So, PW Botha and the National Party held a very negative view of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
DS:  That’s right, and there was a feeling that the old Commonwealth had been… 
South Africa had been part of that, had fought in the war with the British and 
the Canadians and the Australians, and so there was a very strong sense of 
rejection that white South Africans felt. 
 
SO:  Particularly English-speaking South Africans? 
 
DS:  Particularly English-speaking South Africans, and Afrikaners who were 
members of the United Party. There was a certain degree of animosity that 
developed, particularly toward the newly-independent countries but especially 
toward Canadians – because of the role that they’d played – and later to the 
Australians, because of the role they played subsequently with Bob Hawke 
and Malcolm Fraser, in particular. So, I think having Malcolm Fraser on the 
Eminent Persons Group was not a good idea. He was loathed. There was no 
problem with General Obasanjo, no problem at all. But the South African side 
loathed Malcolm Fraser.  
 
SO:  What was the opinion towards Anthony Barber? Was he seen as a 
representative of Britain, as he had been Mrs Thatcher’s suggestion and 
was a former Chancellor? 
 
DS:  There was much greater sympathy, a much greater tendency, to listen to any 
representative of Britain because of Margaret Thatcher. There was a strong 
sense that she was prepared, at least, to take into consideration the 
reasonable concerns of all sides. There was a degree, again, of paranoia – 
maybe not paranoia, because it was well-based – among white South 
Africans at the time. One must understand that, from the end of the 1970s, 
there were huge changes in the country. Up until ‘78, when Vorster was 
Prime Minister and then for a short period as President, there was still 
commitment to the idea of separate development – this chimera, this illusion, 
that Dr Verwoerd had foisted on the country which gave whites the illusion 
that they had a solution to the problem. So, everybody, faithfully – even after 
Verwoerd was dead – kept on implementing this thing. And Vorster would 
say, “This is a problem to be solved by the next generation.” By 1978, when 
Vorster fell from power, it was clear it wasn’t working: it wasn’t going to work. 
We needed a solution, and so PW Botha came along and he was a reformist. 
He said, “Fine. We must adapt or die. We've got a find a way to dismount this 
tiger we find ourselves on. We don’t want to be ruling black people, but how 
the hell do we get off without being eaten? The rest of the world is shouting at 
us, ‘Get off the tiger!’ with not the slightest concern about what might happen 
to us in the process.” That was very much the sense with the Commonwealth, 
with the exception perhaps of Britain.  
 
The other countries represented really weren’t concerned about the interests 
of white South Africans, and white South Africans naturally have a slightly 
different perspective. They had three main concerns. The first was the fear 
that, if we accepted a ‘one-man, one-vote’ outcome at that stage, then it 
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would be ‘one-man, one-vote-once’, as had happened in so many other 
African countries – that we would decline into corruption, dictatorship, ethnic 
conflict etc., etc. That was a real fear, particularly in the wake of refugees 
coming down from Angola and the Congo area and so forth. Then the second 
concern was that Afrikaners actually believed that they were a nation. The 
idea of national self-determination had been the central theme of their history, 
ever since they’d left the Cape, and they had twice fought Britain trying to 
defend that self-determination. And, you know, the Anglo-Boer War was the 
biggest war that Britain fought between the Napoleonic Wars and the First 
World War. It was bigger than Crimean War. It was actually bigger than the 
American Revolution: there were over 400,000 Imperial troops deployed in 
South Africa. But the question for Afrikaners – in the whole of the 20th 
Century, up until 1960 – was this desire of Afrikaners to re-establish their 
republic. So, now the world was asking them to give this up. 
 
SO:  Did English-speaking South Africans that you were involved with, in 
your community, have any similar sense of identity of nationhood with 
the Afrikaners? 
 
DS:  It was emerging, but not to the same extent. There was the beginning of a 
common approach later on. 
 
SO:  But did the Afrikaners community, that you recall, feel that British 
speaking South Africans could ‘always go home’?  
 
DS:  I don’t think at that stage, no, and I think that most English-speaking South 
Africans were orientating toward the kind of response that Smith, an English-
speaking person, had in Rhodesia. So, there was fairly solid support to resist 
the demands being made by the rest of the world, although most English-
speaking South Africans would have been happy to have some kind of 
qualified franchise and move in a direction... They weren’t concerned about 
Afrikaner nationalism. So, they were, you know… The Progressives had this 
idea of qualified franchise, of course, which even by then would have been 
unacceptable to the majority of black South Africans. So, that was the second 
concern – that this couldn’t survive in a one-man, one-vote situation. And 
Afrikaners felt just as strongly about this as Israelis feel about their right to 
national self-determination, and I think that’s why PW Botha just couldn’t take 
this step to give up sovereignty. 
 
The third concern was the role of the South African Communist Party in the 
ANC. People now think, “Oh yeah, ‘Reds under beds’”, but in fact it wasn’t… 
From my vantage point at the UN, I didn’t think this was ‘Reds under beds’ at 
all. The reality – as we subsequently found out – was that virtually all of the 
members of the ANC National Executive Committee during the 70s and the 
80s were also members of the South African Communist Party. We knew that 
the South African Communist Party had the classic two-phase revolutionary 
approach. First phase: national liberation under the vanguard leadership of 
the national liberation movement, i.e. the ANC, [which would] unite all factions 
opposed to the regime etc., etc. Then, with the success of the national 
liberation, the Communist Party becomes the vanguard party and then moves 
on to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and a Communist 
state. Now, I've got not the slightest doubt that that was the game plan during 
most of the 80s. I think that, if we had had a settlement before then – which 
would have been impossible anyway, before 1990 – that would have been the 
path that the SACP would have followed, and the ANC would have come 
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along with it, with the continuing, existing support of the Soviet Union. And I 
wasn’t terribly keen on this. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  I've gathered that! 
 
DS:  And it's still, by the way, the intention of the South African Communist Party. 
The South African Communist Party and COSATU still have this idea, I think, 
[of] an ‘entry-ist’ approach of moving South Africa beyond the ‘National 
Democratic Revolution’ to the Socialist Revolution. So, those were the three 
concerns – and they're reasonable concerns. One is confronting existential 
problems, and that is why it is also very important – within the scope of the 
discussion of sanctions – that people are not going to respond to sanctions if 
they think that their continued existence is at stake. They may be right or they 
may be wrong, but if that is what they truly believe, they're not going to 
change their policies just so that they can play cricket against New Zealand. 
It's not going to happen. And that is one of the reasons why sanctions was 
such a problematic approach in many respects to dealing with the South 
African situation. Something that Margaret Thatcher understood very well. 
Margaret Thatcher understood, also, what the factors were that were actually 
promoting change in South Africa at this time. A lot of people say, “Well, what 
change?” But in fact, the 80s were a period of quite dramatic changes in 
South Africa, starting with the labour reforms of the Wiehahn Commission at 
the end of the 70s, which extended real trade union rights to black South 
Africans for the first time. The tri-cameral Parliament was PW Botha’s effort to 
get one of the legs off the tiger and to bring the coloureds and the Asians into 
a consociational system. And then, of course, the huge debate was, “What 
about the rights of black South Africans?” And it was a conundrum. In the 
meantime, by 1986, I think about a hundred apartheid laws had already been 
repealed. And what incensed Botha further was the complete lack of 
recognition by the international community of these changes which had been 
implemented. It might not have meant very much for the ANC or others, but 
they meant a lot for Botha’s power base, and it led directly to the split of his 
party in 1982. But there was no appreciation of these dynamics by anybody 
other than Margaret Thatcher and later Ronald Reagan.  
 
SO:  Did you feel that Geoffrey Howe, as Margaret Thatcher’s Foreign 
Secretary, was appreciative of these dynamics within South Africa? 
You're very much personalising the intellectual appreciations of 
Thatcher recognising the challenges and the geo-political strains on 
South Africa, and how it was necessary to try to support South Africa 
going through these changes. Did you feel that other British politicians 
were equally as aware? 
 
DS:  No, Geoffrey Howe didn’t want anything to do with it. He was deeply opposed 
to the whole idea. 
 
SO:  He found apartheid morally repugnant and… 
 
DS:  And he thought it was a death trap: “Don’t get involved there. You will get 
carved up, horribly.” And, of course, he was right as far as the Eminent 
Persons Group was concerned, as things turned out. So, you have PW 
Botha, who was very unhappy about what he regarded as the mala fide of the 
West in the negotiations on Namibia…He was also extremely frustrated by 
the fact that these reforms that had cost him a lot, and that had directly led to 
the unrest in the country from 1984 onward and the split of his party, were 
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simply dismissed – not recognised at all. And it led him to conclude that 
nothing but absolute surrender would ultimately satisfy the international 
critics. No, the West would no doubt make a limp effort to hold the line 
somewhere along the road because they didn’t want anything to collapse, but 
at the end of the day, the sense was that the West would shake its head sadly 
and say, “Well, they had it coming to them anyway.” That was the sentiment, I 
think, that motivated P W Botha. The reforms that he introduced were the 
direct, I think…one of the main causes of the unrest. PW hadn’t read de 
Tocqueville and didn’t know that revolutions take place in situations not of 
repression, but of rising expectations. So, all of this poisoned the atmosphere 
incredibly in the run up to the EPG initiative. It was Margaret Thatcher’s 
initiative, and I think that’s why PW dropped his initial absolute opposition to 
it. I think she pointed out that it would be better than the alternative, so give it 
a try. And he did, and again that is an indication of the influence that she had. 
But also I think that, had Margaret Thatcher not been able to hold the line on 
more draconian sanctions at that time, the consequences might have been 
very negative, because PW Botha was just as easily capable of shutting 
down: dropping the shutters and moving into a very grim survivalist regime 
based on military strength, with a much greater potential – military potential –  
than North Korea, by the way. 
 
SO:  Indeed, because by that point you had nuclear capability, certainly, and 
had constructed at least five nuclear devices… 
 
DS:  We had six and half, but it wasn’t the nuclear weapons that worried the 
Americans. It was the fact that we were really advancing very quickly with 
inter-continental missile capability. The Americans played an extremely 
important role: again, because they were prepared to take into consideration 
the reasonable concerns of South Africa. So, Chet Crocker played an 
incredibly important role in managing the whole Namibian process over a 
number of years. It wasn’t going to be quick, but if anybody should have a 
statue to them in Windhoek it's Chet Crocker, because he really did play a 
masterful role in Southern Africa. He understood the dynamics and he 
understood the personalities. He knew how to adjust and to take into 
consideration real concerns, and [he] really applied considerable pressure, on 
the other hand. 
 
SO:  By the time the Namibia question was moving towards a conclusion and 
with the ending of the Angolan war – the parallel withdrawal of Cuban 
troops and the recognition of Namibia moving to independence with the 
Accords signed in New York in December 1988 – do you think that those 
regional scenarios were of critical importance in creating a more 
propitious climate for accelerating change in South Africa itself? 
 
DS:  Absolutely. Again, Margaret Thatcher also understood something which none 
of her contemporaries did: the really important impact of socio-economic 
change that was happening in South Africa at the time. The reality is that it 
wasn’t a static situation. People think about apartheid as a monolithic black 
thing or big white thing [Laughter] that started in 1948 and stopped in 1994. 
But, of course, it wasn’t like that: it was subject to the same forces and 
influences as any other political situation. One of the main ones was the 
dramatic changes that started to happen on the socio-economic front from 
1970 onwards. We had reasonably rapid economic growth during the 50s – 
about 4.5% – but rapid economic growth in the 60s and in the first half of the 
70s brought more and more black South Africans into the economy at higher 
17 
 
and higher levels. For example, in 1970, the black share of personal 
disposable income was 22% and the white share was 67%, and coloureds 
and Asians were the remainder. By 1994, the white share of personal 
disposable income had dropped to below 50% and the black share was 
around 38%, with coloureds and Asians and the rest.  
 
Now, this might sound rather statistical, but it translated to quite a rapidly 
closing gap between relative incomes. Not that it's significant on a per capita 
basis, but it meant that large swathes of the consumer market were now 
controlled by black South Africans. So, it also meant that cities were 
becoming more integrated. The Verwoerdian idea of “unscrambling the 
omelette” was doomed to failure more quickly than it otherwise might have 
been. It meant also that whites began to realise that they could not manage 
the rapidly growing economy on the base of four-and-a-half million whites: 
more and more black people – just out of necessity – had to become 
employed in the economy. Hence the Wiehahn Commission report and the 
idea that, first of all, you had to have a proper relationship between 
management and labour. But then, also during the 80s, more and more 
companies – under the influence of the Sullivan codes and the European 
employment codes – started bringing black South Africans into white collar 
jobs at higher and higher levels. So, you would have a black bank teller 
working beside a white bank teller, with the same qualifications, doing the 
same job. No way they're going to go to separate restaurants; no way they're 
going to go to separate places of entertainment, or ultimately to separate 
suburbs, and the reality is that under the pressure of the socio-economic 
forces, apartheid, such as it was, was crumbling. Across a broad front, 
hundreds of thousands of black South Africans had moved into so-called 
white areas. Without being opposed. This was a really, really significant 
process. Government often came along, and what PW Botha called ‘reform’ 
was legislative recognition of what was already happening on the ground. 
 
SO:  I've got three things coming out of this. First, I'm very struck by the 
similarity of the language you’ve just used with that of de Klerk’s 
autobiography, which I know that you helped him write… 
 
DS:  Well, I wrote it! [Laughter]  
 
SO:  …[Laughter] To what extent are these arguments indeed your own 
arguments, or had you reached these conclusions with FW de Klerk? 
 
DS:  We have a symbiotic relationship. [Laughter] The other thing, too, is the 
changes in education. Again, if you listen to people, anything that was 
remembered from before 1994 was Dr Verwoerd’s statement – taken out of 
context –in 1954 that, “Blacks cannot be trained above a certain level 
because they will be more or less hewers of wood and drawers of water.” In 
fact, the situation began to change quite dramatically again at the end of the 
70s. In 1980, just a little fewer than 30,000 black South Africans wrote the 
matric exam, and of those 15,000 passed. In the same year about 49,000 
whites wrote the matric exam; probably about 95% passed. By 1994, 410,000 
blacks wrote matric and 201,000 passed. That was now three times as many 
as white matriculants. So, by 1994, there were more non-whites registered in 
South African universities than whites.  
 
SO:  So, you're describing very powerful socio-economic forces at play here: 
shaping and reframing South African society. People often argue that 
18 
 
disinvestment was one of the factors that prompted the end of 
apartheid, because the economy was starting to stutter and falter and 
yet it needed to maintain its dynamism if there was to be a degree of 
peaceful change. The second factor helping to explain the end of 
apartheid is held to be the role of sport sanctions.  
 
DS:  Not at all. It would be foolish to say that sanctions had no effect: obviously, 
they were extremely unpleasant and they caused sometimes serious 
distortions in the economy. They led us to spend twelve billion Rand investing 
in Mossgas, which was not really a fruitful investment. And they cost about 
1.5% per annum in economic growth. But at no time did they seriously affect 
daily life in South Africa. On the contrary, they had a lot of effects that were 
the opposite of intentions. It was, in effect, a classic example of the law of 
unexpected consequences: when you interfere with economic processes for 
ideological purposes, the result of your action is nearly always the opposite of 
your intention. Take, for example, the arms embargo. Because of the threat of 
the arms embargo from the beginning of the 60s, South Africa developed 
maybe the fifth or sixth largest armaments industry in the world. And not only 
did we develop the industry for ourselves: it was one of our biggest exports. 
Because of the oil sanctions, we bought up an enormous amount of oil at the 
beginning of the 60s at about $1.50 a barrel and put it in gold mines. When 
the price went up to whatever it was - $80 – at the end of the 70s, the 
government sold it and made a huge profit. It also spurred the government to 
establish Sasol, which was producing maybe 40-45% of the country’s 
petroleum requirements. We could always get oil; it wasn’t a problem. 
Although you had to pay a premium again, so… But that was the difficulty. 
Then, as for disinvestment, again the reality was so far removed from the 
theory or the perception that it's almost unbelievable. You take, for example, 
the investment of General Motors in South Africa. For all of the good people 
in the United States who thought they were punishing the horrible apartheid 
government by disinvesting from South Africa… They had this idea a whole 
lot of money would be pulled out of South Africa, the nasty whites would be 
punished and the good blacks would be rewarded, and everybody would be 
able to tell one another what good people they were, etc., etc. What were the 
realities? The only funds that ever came from Detroit to Port Elizabeth were 
£25,000 in 1926. All of the rest of the investment was locally-generated loans 
and locally-generated profits. It was worth about 600 million Rand, I think, by 
the time of disinvestment. Now, because of the enormous pressure on 
General Motors, they did disinvest, but what do you do? They had to sell it to 
somebody, and the only possible buyers were the white South African 
management. So, they sold it to the white South African management. But 
there was only one problem, and that is that they didn’t have enough money. 
So, for the first time since 1926, money went from Detroit to Port Elizabeth – I 
think about 130 million Rand or so – to enable white South Africans to buy out 
an American interest at about a third or a quarter of its price! The company 
continued to make exactly the same Opal vehicles without losing a beat, 
except it was no longer subject to the Sullivan principles, so they could do all 
of the things they wanted to do, to rationalise, that they couldn’t do before. 
They fired a lot of black and coloured employees and the company started to 
make a bigger profit. 
 
SO:  Because its overheads were reduced, yes.  
 
DS:  Again, my wife’s father was the chairman of a big American oil company here 
– Caltex. I don’t think he was particularly religious, but I'm sure that, in this 
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period, if you peeked into his bedroom at night, you’d have seen him praying 
fervently for Caltex to disinvest. [Laughter] Which they never did, 
unfortunately. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  So, he never made the killing that he hoped for. 
 
DS:  That’s right. 
 
SO:  Sports Sanctions…You said they made no impact whatsoever? 
 
DS:  No, obviously they made people feel very upset and unhappy and isolated. 
The reality is that you're not going to adopt policies that you think will be 
suicidal because you're playing cricket again Australia. Yeah? It's just not 
going to happen. 
 
SO:  I'm just wondering if you felt that, for other South Africans not involved 
in policy-making, that sport sanctions might have had a greater 
influence. After all, this is a sports-mad nation. 
 
DS:  Absolutely not. And you can see that by the way people voted. The National 
Party won election after election on the basis of standing up to threats from 
overseas. And that happens to other targeted countries as well. So, it is just 
not the way. Sanctions can be used as a weapon in particular circumstances, 
but not when there are perceived existential threats involved. What changes 
countries, on the contrary, are the old process of economic growth – social 
and economic change. It's exposure to the international community that 
changes attitudes. The reason that the National Party changed – one of the 
underlying reasons – was that there were huge movements within the 
Afrikaner population between 1948 and 1978. In 1948, the National Party was 
a party of small poor farmers and blue collar workers, with a smattering of 
teachers and intelligentsia. It was genuinely a Socialist party. They didn’t like 
big business, and there were strong trade unions. They didn’t like Anglo-
American and the big mining houses. And the first thing they did when coming 
into power was to vastly increase the role of the state in the economy. So, 
you had that, but then, by 1978, the situation had changed a great deal. A 
whole segment of the Afrikaner population had migrated to the middle class – 
again, because of the economic growth of the 50s and 60s. [They] had gone 
to university and, more importantly, they had travelled: they’d gone to the 
United States and Britain and they became… 
 
SO:  So, you're arguing that rather than being an isolated redoubt 
somewhere at the bottom corner of Africa, in fact, the Afrikaner 
constituency was better educated, more urbanised, more 
sophisticated…? 
 
DS:  It was changing, and as that happened, many of those involved became more 
and more uncomfortable with apartheid. I think FW de Klerk is a prime 
example: he was an Abe Bailey Scholar and went to Britain as one of a 
number of South African students. I think that probably had a very big impact 
on him; his horizons before then didn’t stretch much beyond the Western 
Transvaal. So, you change people and you change societies by exposing 
them to contacts [and] by promoting economic growth. So, sanctions would 
have just the opposite effect. Reducing the economic growth rate is really 
dumb. The other thing, too, for example, is that I think that the fact that the 
SABC showed the Cosby Show at the end of the 70s or the beginning of the 
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80s probably changed the attitudes of whites to race more dramatically than 
any of the cultural sanctions of… 
 
SO:  So, you think light entertainment really should be borne in mind as a…  
 
DS:  I absolutely do, because it introduced ordinary white South Africans to models 
of social behaviour involving blacks that they just weren’t aware of. 
 
SO:  I've got two questions to draw to a conclusion. What's your view of the 
role of the international community and international players in 
assisting transition? Allister Sparks has said it was very much a South 
African success – it wasn’t the UN, there wasn’t a Vance-Owen Plan, it 
wasn’t a Lancaster House. But would you identify key players, key 
international forces, helping South Africa’s transition? 
 
DS:  Yes, I think so. I agree basically with Allister that the strength of the South 
Africa process was precisely that it was home grown. And it was actually quite 
a sophisticated process, too. Some of the Arab countries going through 
transitions would have done well to have looked a little bit closer at the 
mechanisms of the negotiating forum at CODESA. It was a sophisticated 
process, and it involved and was driven overwhelmingly by South Africans. 
But that doesn’t mean that foreign interests didn’t and couldn’t play a positive 
– and sometimes very positive – role in helping to nudge things in the right 
direction, particularly when they got off the track. As, for example, they did in 
June 1992, in the ‘winter of discontent’. I think that Western influence there – 
in front of and behind the scenes – and all of the parties urging them to return, 
particularly the ANC, to negotiations, probably had some influence. 
 
SO:  Would you identify any particular international influence, or was this 
pretty much a general surge of encouragement? 
 
DS:  I think that Robin Renwick played a good role, and so did Princeton Lyman, 
the American Ambassador. They were both ready to put their shoulders to the 
wheel when it seemed that the process needed assistance, pushing it here or 
pushing it there. And I think that Margaret Thatcher also played a very 
important role in staving off draconian sanctions until the situation was more 
ripe for change – which happened, of course, in 1989-1990. That is probably 
her main contribution to the process: that she helped to hold the line and that, 
had we really been confronted by draconian sanctions in 1986, had PW Botha 
got the impression that there was no alternative but resistance, then it could 
have been a completely different situation. It was so important to ensure that 
everything remained on track until the situation became ripe. By ‘ripe’, I mean 
until all sides really, seriously agreed that there could not be an armed or 
revolutionary outcome, and the ANC really only accepted that around 1988-
89 – ironically, with the success of the 1986 state of emergency. Another 
really important thing was the successful implementation of the Namibian 
Independence Plan. If things had gone wrong in Namibia – if there had been 
a revolutionary take over by SWAPO, as Sam Nujoma wanted – it would have 
been much more difficult for the South African government to persuade its 
supporters that there could be positive outcomes to negotiations with your 
enemies and properly constructed constitutions, etc., etc. So, I think the 
success of the Namibian process… 
 
SO:  And Thatcher played a part there, too. 
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DS:  Yeah exactly…[Namibia] was of considerable importance in the process. 
Then there were other elements that happened more by luck than by 
planning. PW Botha’s withdrawal from the scene was perhaps essential 
before we could move forward, because – he could go to Mount Nebo and he 
could cross the Jordan River – he just wouldn’t give up that idea of national 
self-determination, because he belonged to the 1948 generation. And FW de 
Klerk was prepared to do it within a consociational framework with a good 
constitution, etc., etc. Now, that was very important. And then, of course, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was critically important. It not only meant that the 
central strategic threat disappeared, but it meant that the SACP was in 
disarray. The whole idea of a two phase revolution was in shambles. It looked 
very unlikely that any emerging party would be able to avoid the Washington 
Consensus. So, a window of opportunity was opened at the beginning of 
1990. 
 
SO:  So, you feel that the end of the Cold War was of critical importance? 
 
DS:  It was of critical importance, for all of these reasons. We were really 
concerned about the geo-strategic threat, so the withdrawal of the Cubans 
was very important, but also the withdrawal of Mr Vladimir Shubin [i.e. of 
Soviet military advisers]. [Laughter] 
 
SO:  Indeed. 
 
DS:  That was very important, because we felt we could always deal with the ANC 
– as fellow South Africans – but we were not sure we could deal with the alien 
influence of the South Africa Communist Party. 
 
SO:  How aware were you that the Secretary General of the Commonwealth 
was giving guidance and advice to the ANC? The Secretariat, of course, 
was providing advice on economic strategic planning, post-transition, 
to the ANC at this particular time. 
 
DS:  Again, I think anything that helped the ANC to move away from its original 
position on nationalisation and central planning to the position they ultimately 
adopted under Trevor Manuel was really welcome. But I think there were a 
number of factors involved in that. 
 
SO:  Yes. 
 
DS:  But, again…Anything that moved in that direction was good. 
 
SO:  Okay, so you weren’t aware of this, but you would have welcomed it as 
an adjunct to negotiations.  
 
DS:  Absolutely. 
 
SO:  Did you have any qualms or any views on South Africa’s decision to re-
join the Commonwealth under Alfred Nzo? I know it was ‘Point Five’ on 
his list of priorities on becoming Foreign Minister after 1994.   
 
DS:  No, I think everybody was very happy to come back to the Commonwealth. 
No problem. 
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SO:  Would you say that South Africa has played a particular role in the 
Commonwealth since? I know that you stayed on as Chief of Staff of de 
Klerk’s office after 1994. Do you think that South Africa brought a 
particular moral authority to the Commonwealth? 
 
DS:  Not really. I think South Africa’s efforts were focussed more on the OAU, at 
that time – the African Union, later – and the United Nations, etc.  
 
SO:  From your standpoint now at the de Klerk Foundation, how important 
would you say is South Africa in the Commonwealth? Or is its focus 
now primarily towards the BRICS, in South/South relations, in its 
regional relations? 
 
DS:  I would say that South Africa’s list of priorities would probably be BRICS, 
United Nations…No, I think BRICS, African Union, United Nations, 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO:  Okay. Down the pecking order, but somewhere there. 
 
DS:  Somewhere there, yeah. 
 
SO:  Dave, thank you very much indeed. 
 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE]  
